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This article reviews the history of China-Vietnam’s relations from the time of the 
independence of Vietnam in 939 until the reign of the Ly dynasty (1010 – 1225). It 
focuses on how China and Vietnam established a relationship based on the tributary 
system and how far these early ties had affected the political continuity of the Chinese 
Song and the Vietnamese Dinh, Le and Ly dynasties. In addition, this is an attempt to 
analyse Vietnam’s view on China’s World Order in its relationship with China. It also 
illustrates that China’s “all under heaven” concept suggests a sense of unity in the 
Chinese world, derived from the moral conformity of its society; and how during the 
Song dynasty, China based itself on this moral conformity when it set out to develop a 
relationship with its neighbours, in this case, Vietnam. 
 





Vietnam had long been a Chinese tributary and was, in fact, the earliest country in 
Southeast Asia to establish ties with China. The relationship had been established since 
111 BC and it had an accustomed place in the Sinocentric East Asian system of 
international relations. The growth of Vietnam was closely linked to the rise and fall of 
the Chinese dynasties and the situation which prevailed in China. For example, the 
decline of the Tang dynasty (618 – 907) in the 8th century made an impact not only on 
China but also Vietnam. The Tang’s collapse which threw the country into chaos, gave 
way to the rise of the states known as Wudai Shiguo (The Period of Five Dynasties and 
Ten Kingdoms, 906-960) in China. Vietnam also took advantage of this political 
uncertainty to free itself from China’s clutches after having been colonized by it for 
over a millennium. Ngo Quyen (938-944) successfully forced China’s military in Bach 
Dang situated in the north of Vietnam which covers the district of Ha Bac, Hai Hung 
and Quang Ninh, to withdraw in 939 and subsequently, established the Ngo dynasty 
(939-968).  
  Joseph Buttinger suggests that the Vietnamese victory of 939 was largely 
attributed to the persistence of the Vietnamese in their struggle for independence and 
the political disintegration of China’s Tang dynasty.1 Thus, this article examines the 
relationship between the two countries, or rather specifically the two dynasties, to 
assess the extent to which Vietnam, a former colonial state, could successfully maintain 
its sustainability and continuity after its change of status. There is also the question of 
how far the Song dynasty (China) was willing to recognise the independence of the 
Ngo dynasty (Vietnam) amidst the turmoil in China. 
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Relationship of Chinese Song Dynasty With Vietnamese Ngo and Dinh Dynasties  
 
Vietnam’s (read: Giao Chi交趾) independence in 939 put an end to the period of 
Chinese imperial domination but it remained in a fragile state.2 The Ngo dynasty (939-
965) was unable to control the local chiefs known as Hung Vuong or Su Quan because 
the ruling power was still in their hands. Since Ngo Quyen failed to gain 
acknowledgement of his legitimacy as a ruler from China, he could not get the 
unanimous support of the local authorities. Furthermore, the Ngo dynasty was still 
recorded as Ngoai Ky (not officially confirmed as a dynasty in Vietnamese history) 
because he was still known as a ‘military governor’, and not a king (vuong).3 These 
local chiefs possessed their own territories and constantly tried to dominate one 
another. Ngo Quyen died at the age of 46 before he had time to consolidate his 
position; Vietnam was little more than a protectorate of the Chinese empire. China, on 
its part, viewed the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations as more of a relationship of the 
central government (China) vis-à-vis the local government (Vietnam). Therefore, local 
political institutions were not interfered with, and authority still lay in the hands of the 
local feuding chiefs. 
  Vietnam (read: Thap Nhi Su Quan十二使君), experiencing internal conflicts 
among its independent chiefs, became disunited. When the last heir of the Ngo dynasty, 
Thien-Sach Vuong died in 967, the conflicts exacerbated to the extent that the era was 
known as “The Twelve Lords Rebellion”.4 Amidst the rivalry, Dinh Bo Linh (968 – 
979) emerged victorious to unite Vietnam as a powerful entity known as Dai Co Viet. 
Dinh Bo Linh was originally a general in Tran Lam’s military and one of the twelve 
Lords (Su Quan).5  In 968, he founded the Dinh dynasty (968-980), shifted the capital 
from Lo Loa to Hoa Lu which located in Ninh Binh and declared himself as Dinh Tien 
Hoang De (The First August Emperor Dinh) with his reign of Thai Binh inaugurated in 
970.6  
  Understandably, Dinh Bo Linh did not want to confront the Song armies 
unnecessarily, and so he sent his eldest born, Dinh Lien and ambassadors of goodwill 
with tributes of gold bars, rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks and fragrances to have his 
reign of Thai Binh recognised and inaugurated by Emperor Song Taizu (960-976).7 
Tributes were then continuously sent to China from Dai Co Viet, as Vietnam was 
called at that time (See Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Vietnamese Emissary Missions (of the Dinh Dynasty) to China 
 
Year Emmisaries Mission 
975 Trinh Tu Presented rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, fragrances and 
gold bars to the Song dynasty.  
975 Zu Wangyan  
(from China) 
Attended Dinh Lien’s coronation as Giao Chi Quan Vuong  
976 Nguyen Vien 
Thai  
Delivered condolences on the death of Emperor Song Taizu 
977 Nguyen Vien 
Thai 
Delivered congratulatory speech at the coronation of Emperor 
Song Taizong  
 
Source: Songshi (History of the Song Dynasty), Vol. 488, Lie Zhuan (Collective     
   Biographies), No. 247, Wai Guo Shi: Jiaozhi (Foreign Countries: Giao Chi) 
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Song-dinh Tributary Terms and Rationale 
 
Both the Dinh and the Song dynasties then worked out the basis for their mutual 
relations to transform Vietnam’s position into that of a vassal or tributary state within 
the Chinese orbit. Vietnam acknowledged itself a tributary of China, with the 
understanding that it would not be occupied by the Chinese troops or subjected to 
Chinese administration. It also agreed to send tribute missions to Kaifeng (central 
China’s Henan province), the Chinese capital.  
  In return, Emperor Song Taizu (960–976) acknowledged and nominated 
Dinh Bo Linh (968-979) as Jiaozhi junwang or Giao Chi quan vuong (Commandery 
Prince of Jiaozhi) which signified the recognition of Vietnam as one of his 
protectorates and not as a colonised state.8  Brantly Womack states that as the Song 
Dynasty consolidated its rule in the south in 973, it anticipated the difficulty of 
reconquering a territory that had withstood the Chinese army, and it was clear that the 
dynasty’s major military problems lay in the north.9 Moreover, being newly crowned, 
Emperor Song Taizu knew he had to approach the neighbouring countries including 
Vietnam with diplomacy. He also realised that the spread of Confucianism to all its 
protectorates could help China gain their loyalty.10 It had been centuries of Chinese 
practice to employ the rich symbolism of the ceremonial forms and perhaps above all, 
the use of moralistic Confucian political terminology in formal contacts between China 
and her tributaries including Vietnam as they served to soften the outline of the realities 
of power which lay beneath. 
  Finally, Vietnam promised to reciprocate by presenting tributes to China 
every three years, using the lunar calendar; and giving reports on Vietnam’s progress. 
China promised to protect Vietnam when required and to acknowledge it as its 
protectorate.11 Dinh Bo Linh was the first to be conferred the title of Giao Chi Quan 
Vuong (King of Giao Chi) as the previous rulers were only given the title ‘Military 
Governor of Giao Chi’.12 Although acknowledged as an independent country, Vietnam 
was still under the Emperor’s control in line with the Chinese cosmopolitan space of 
Wufu (Five Domains) as specified below: 
 
“Dian Domains in Five Hundred Miles: People in the nearest area, within one 
hundred miles away from the capital should render their service by submitting all 
their harvests. Other contributions required were eared millet from those in the 
region of two hundred miles away from the capital; hard-skinned millet from those, 
three hundred miles away; raw millet from the area, four hundred miles away and 
refined millet from the area, five hundred miles away. Hou Domains in Five 
Hundred Miles away from the Extreme of Dian Domains: People in the nearest area, 
one hundred miles away from the extreme of the Dian s Domains, should render 
their transport service to the emperor, those in the area, two hundred miles away 
were to contribute to their dukedom while people in the area three hundred miles 
away should gather intelligence of danger.”13 
 
 
  The above Dian Domains stipulations categorized according to geographical 
location from China’s orbit, reflected the Chinese Emperor’s perception of himself as 
the ruler whose sovereignty and greatness must always be acknowledged by Vietnam. 
In this idealized, concentric structure of the Five Domains, the king’s capital was not 
only the political center but also the pivot of the cosmic-social order.14 
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  James Anderson argues that, for Dinh Bo Linh the tributary relationship 
would help to strengthen the position of the Dinh dynasty in the eyes of the Vietnamese 
as China’s recognition verified the dynasty’s political legitimacy and confirmed his 
validity as a ruler.15 Indeed, the period of the Song dynasty in China and the Dinh 
dynasty (968-980) in Vietnam had drawn up a new phase in the Sino-Vietnamese 
diplomatic relations based on the tributary system that was established centuries ago. 
The difference is that it signalled the start of a real country-to-country- contact model 
of tributary relationship between the two countries.  
 
 
Song Dynasty’s Move to Recapture Vietnam and its Consequences 
 
In 979, Dinh Bo Linh was assassinated by Do Thich (? -979), a guard who tried to 
usurp the throne. After three days, the coup d’etat was ended by Nguyen Bac. Do 
Thich’s bones were crushed; his body was chopped for the Vietnamese to chew. 16 
Dinh Bo Linh was then succeeded by his second prince Dinh Phe De (979-980) who 
was only six years old then. After killing Do Thich, Nguyen Bach tried to overthrow 
Dinh Phe De. Angered upon hearing the news, Emperor Song Taizong (976–997) 
launched an attack on Vietnam.17  
  The Song Emperor decreed, “Dispatch troops to supress the rebellion, as it is 
a rational measure. By suppressing the protest movement, the power struggle that often 
happens can be contained.” In the meantime, the Commissioner in Guangxi reported 
that: 
 
“The family of Dinh Bo Linh was being set up by rebels, revolts seemed to occur 
everywhere (in Vietnam), and it was increasingly difficult for the people to 
accumulate a fortune by relying solely on farming. Despite these troubled times, 
Vietnam’s ruling dynasty had been sending a caravan carrying tributes to China’s 
court periodically.’18   
 
In view of the above report, China believed that it was important to have control of the 
situation in Vietnam in its capacity as the latter’s overlord. It also believed that only 
Vietnam’s legitimate heir to the throne, recognized by China could be appointed as the 
ruler in Vietnam. Hence, in 981, China deployed its military forces led by General Hou 
Renbao (侯仁宝 (?–981) to Vietnam to suppress the coup, the basic reason of which 
was to safeguard the sovereignty of the Dinh dynasty, its vassal.19 However, to what 
extent is this a fact? According to Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian’s (Extended 
Continuation to Zizhi Tongjian) record,20 before the advance of the forces of the Song 
dynasty to Vietnam roughly around 980, the emperor had summoned an officer in 
Yongzhou (district near modern day Nanning), Hou Renbao to discuss with the king 
the necessary preparation. However, he was stopped by the prime minister, Lu Duoxun 
(934-985) who believed that: 
 
“Giao Chi (Jiaozhou) is on the verge of chaos which is a sign from heaven. Our 
kingdom (China)  can send troops to attack by surprise; Nonetheless, if officials 
from the border are instructed to come to the capital, it is concerned that the plan 
may be revealed and they (Vietnam) will learn about it. They (Vietnam) will be 
prepared and will besiege all paths including the water route. This will make it 
difficult for our forces to advance (Song).”21  
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  Later, in the seventh month of the same year, Emperor Song Taizong went 
ahead with his plan and ordered Lu Duoxun to capture Vietnam. This attack was no 
longer viewed as just the intention of China to preserve the integrity of the Song 
dynasty as the overlord of its protectorate, Vietnam but also clearly  its intention to 
conquer Vietnam completely in order to absorb the country into its colonies. Emperor 
Song Taizong believed that because it was then the golden period of the Song dynasty, 
and as the superior state, China would not simply tolerate the total independence of 
Vietnam.  Should that happen, it would mean that Vietnam could slip out of China’s 
grip as what had happened in the past when China’s political upheaval was taken 
advantage of by Vietnam to declare its own independence.    
  In 980, the Song dynasty mounted an assault on Vietnam by land and water.  
However, the lack of patience and thorough planning cost China dearly. The Song 
dynasty had underestimated Vietnam’s military capabilities, thinking that the internal 
conflicts in Vietnam would have affected its army’s readiness and strength. Although 
China had the upper hand initially, unfortunately, miscommunication between its water 
and land armies caused the battle timing to go wrong. In addition to that, at the later 
stage, its soldiers, not acclimatised to the surroundings, died in large numbers, causing 
the mission to fail.  
  The Song dynasty, albeit reluctantly, accepted the defeat and gave up the idea 
of retaking Vietnam. A system called Jimi zhi (羈縻制) had to be introduced to 
Vietnam instead.  The Jimi system was an administrative model unit in China which 
was introduced to every military leader either militarily subdued or self-subdued and 
naturalized. These groups received orders directly from the central power in China 
although it allowed them the freedom to retain their names as long as they submitted to 
the orders of the Chinese emperor. Indeed, the Jimi System was seen as a system which 
was necessary at the time because China was beginning to lose control of Vietnam.22 
 
 
Relationship of Chinese Song Dynasty with Vietnamese Le Dynasty   
 
Although Le Hoan (941-1005), the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief, succeeded in 
repulsing the Song dynasty invasion, he was forced to submit to China because he 
realised that Vietnam’s military power was limited. As he was also worried about the 
strength of the Song dynasty, he planned a strategy to evade an attack from China. 
Accordingly, in 938, in the name of Dinh Toan, he sent an envoy to China to seek the 
pardon of the Song Emperor. Le Hoan who had actually declared himself as Giao Chỉ 
Vuong (King of Giao Chi). He claimed that‘Dinh Toan and his mother had led an army 
and the people against China. They appointed Le Hoan as the new ruler.’23 
Masquerading as Dinh Xuan, Le Hoan manipulated the situation to obtain China’s 
recognition of his validity as the new ruler in Vietnam. He justified the  advance of 
Vietnam’s military against the Dinh dynasty with the excuse, among others, that he 
acted out of  a desire to  serve the people of Vietnam who lived in depravity under the 
Dinh dynasty.  
  However, the Song dynasty rejected Le Hoan’s explanation and instead, the 
latter was given an ultimatum. “Dinh Xuan will continue to rule Vietnam and be 
appointed as general with Le Hoan as his deputy; or send Dinh Xuan and his mother as 
well as all their family members to China. As soon as they arrive in China, Le Hoan 
will be given jiemao (a staff attached with the tail of a yak) as appointment of power to 
rule Vietnam.”24 
   Obviously, Le Hoan was unable to fullfill China’s request because in truth he 
had proclaimed himself as Vietnam’s ruler while the Dinh dynasty’s family was killed 
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in the coup.25 Emperor Song Taizong’s offer was ignored, as confirmed in Songshi 
(History of the Song Dynasty) that ‘at that time, Le Hoan who had already taken over 
the Vietnamese territory, did not accept the order from China.’26 
  Meanwhile, in the years 982 and 983, Le Hoan raided Champa twice. His 
strategy was to first ‘capture 39 generals from Champa meant to be presented to China 
and then, to inform the Song dynasty of his victory in defeating the Champa soldiers 
and capturing millions of war prisoners.27 Generally, Le Hoan would inform China of 
everything that happened in Vietnam for the fact that China was the state’s overlord. 
However, it was apparently his cunning tactics to use the information to serve the Song 
ruler a warning that Vietnam’s military was strong and ready. In other words, it 
conveyed the idea to China that Vietnam was even able to defeat Champa, an old 
empire which once had control of the centre and south of Vietnam in the 7th century.  
Hence, to defeat the Song dynasty which was in recovery after the civil war would not 
be a problem to Vietnam. This appeared to be a reminder to the Song dynasty to 
relinquish its ambition to recapture Vietnam. The Song dynasty had the same thought 
when it decided to acknowledge Le Hoan as ruler and to terminate its support for the 
Dinh’s successor. The recognition, however, was limited to Le Hoan’s validity as King 
of Giao Chi who founded the Le Dynasty in Vietnam in 993.   
  This has led Keith Taylor to consider that Le Hoan’s succession to the throne 
was achieved through manipulation which deterred the Song dynasty from recapturing 
Vietnam. Le Hoan had also managed to unite the Vietnamese to put aside their 
misunderstanding and fight against the advancing Song forces. After having defeatad 
the Song army, he successfully established his kingdom which lasted until the 14th 
century.28 
  Despite Le Hoan’s (941-1005) successes in warding off China’s military 
attack followed by founding the Early Le dynasty (980-1009), he offered to remain 
loyal to China. He was the Commander-in-chief in Dinh Bo Linh’s military and then 
acted as regent to  the king’s successor, Dinh Phe De (974-1001) whom he later 
dethroned his victory in chasing out China from Vietnam had garnered him support 
from the court officials. Moreover, after deposing Dinh Phe De, he had the blessings of 
the queen, to ascend to the throne and establish the Early Le dynasty. He declared 
himself as the ruler, Dai Co Viet with the title Thien Phuc and set up his capital in Hoa 
Lu.29  
  In 983, the first envoy was sent to China to appeal for his coronation. It had 
been the belief of the rulers of Vietnam that only through receiving a title from the 
Chinese dynasties could they have the political backing to strengthen their position 
within the country. Only with the title bestowment by China could the people be 
convinced that they were the legitimate rulers. At the same time, China could also 
show its suzerain position and lofty prestige as the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. That is why, 




Song - le Tributary Terms and Rationale 
 
Not long after the Dinh dynasty was established, Vietnam was  actively sending 
tributes to seek from China title bestowment, andacknowledgment of its sovereignty. 
The Song dynasty first conferred on Dinh Lian the title Tinh Hai quan Tiet do su 
(Jinghai Regiments) and then Protectorate General of Annam. However, for Dinh Bo 
Linh, it was decided that he ‘could be granted the title Giao-chi Quan Vuong or King 
of Giao Chi Prefecture. It was the first time in the history of China that a ruler of 
Vietnam was given the title ‘king’.30 
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  On the surface, this showed that the Song dynasty had treated the Dinh 
dynasty rather leniently despite its involvement in the domestic anarchy that ended the 
Ngo dynasty. However, this was not the real picture. China had to unite the country and 
strengthen its political power. Its strong opponent, Champa, also posed a threat. Under 
these circumstances, it had no choice but to show leniency, with the aim of temporarily 
stabilising Vietnam to withstand external threats to provide China the respite necessary 
for gathering enough strength to resolve the situation. At the same time, the Dinh 
dynasty, in order to ensure its own safety, had actively sent tributes  to maintain its 
tributary relationship with China which would then have no valid reason to dispatch 
troops to Vietnam.  
  In contrast, when it was Le Hoan’s turn to request for title investiture, the 
Song dynasty’s initial decision was to reject him and instead counter propose absolute 
submission from him. It was because the Song dynasty was unwilling to accept its loss 
in the war while still harbouring the desire to reclaim Vietnam; besides as the suzerain 
lord of Vietnam, China had been unable to protect its vassal —the Dinh dynasty. The 
rejection of Le Hoan’s request could in a way help to salvage some of its reputation. 
Eventually, when the Song ruler realized that Vietnam was getting stronger, he was 
compelled to acknowledge Le Hoan in 986 but only appointed him as Annan Duhu 
(Superior Prefect of Annam). It was only at the end of 993 after the Song Emperor was 
convinced that he would remain loyal, was he appointed Giao Chi Quan Vuong (King 
of Giao Chi) with the title Nam Binh Vuong (King of the Southern Pacified Region). To 
secure recognition and forgiveness from the Song emperor, Le Hoan sent five tribute-
bearing envoys to China between 982 and 994.31  
  In exchange for the acknowledgement, the Song dynasty hoped that Le 
dynasty would help to control and coordinate the foreigners around Vietnam and to 
spread the teachings of Confucianism around the south of China.32  This was due to 
China’s perception that Vietnam was a primitive country with indigenous tribes or 
Nanman (Southern Barbarians) located to the south west of China.33 
 
 
Relationship of Chinese Song Dynasy and Vietnamese Ly Dynasty  
 
After Le Hoan’s death in 1005, there was another fight for the throne among his heirs. 
Upon hearing this, Emperor Song Zhenzong (998–1022) sent a message to the princes 
advising them to stop fighting among themselves.34 Although the power struggle did 
not stop, there was nothing China could do as they should not be meddling in the 
internal affairs of their protectorate seeing that the conflict was among the legitimate 
heirs as argue by Guo Zhenduo and Zhang Xiaomei.35  By 1010, the Early Le dynasty 
(980 – 1009) came to an end when Le Long Dinh (1005–1009), its last ruler died at the 
age of 24. Ly Cong Uan (1010-1028) then founded the Ly dynasty (1009-1225) with 
the royal name of Ly Thai To (Thuan Thien). When he was three years old, he was 
adopted by Van Hanh, a monk because his mother was believed to have been 
impregnated in a dream by a wizard while on her way to the temple to pray. Van Hanh 
was a military commander in the Early Le dynasty. After the death of its last heir, 
several high officials and the monks conspired to install Ly Cong Uan as king. The new 
king shifted the capital to Dai La which was then known as Thang Long (Hanoi 
today).36  
  In 1016, China appointed Ly Cong Uan as Jinghai Junjie Dushi (Jingha’s 
Military Commissioner). He was also crowned Giao Chi Quan Vuong with the title 
Nam Binh Vuong (The King of the Pacified South).37  In 1028, for the first time, China 
even responded by sending to Vietnam (read: Dai Viet大越) tributes which included a 
set of royal robes and currency.38 The approach taken by the Song dynasty was 
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obviously different from previously. As stated by Li Shengwei that it had shown more 
initiative in recognizing Ly’s political power based on the reality of the situation then.  
The change in attitude was also reflected in  the Song dynasty’s change of heart about  
reclaiming Vietnam. Instead, it opted for the tributary system as its policy towards the 
country.39 
  When Ly Thai To died, his heir, Ly Phat Ma (1028-1054) broke the news to 
Emperor Song Rezong (1023-1063) who sent out emissaries lead by Wang Wei to 
Vietnam to pay their respects to the late ruler. China also bestowed on him the 
posthumous title of Than Vu Hoang De. 
 
 
Song-ly Tributary Terms and Rationale 
 
China-Vietnam’s tributary relations during the Song era and the Ly dynasty are of great 
significance. For the first time China reciprocated the tribute from Vietnam. The 
deployment of officers from China to attend a funeral ceremony for a deceased king of 
Vietnam was another first. Thirdly, the title of vuong (king) instead of the previous 
quan vuong (of noble class) was conferred on the rulers of Vietnam. These three 
aspects highlighted the drastic changes and impressive progress in their relationship 
which were unprecedented.40 Later, in the reign of Ly Thanh Tong (1054-1072) the 
relationship of the two countries reached another level when in 1055, Emperor Song 
Renzong (1023–1063) presented him tributes in the form of daily necessities that were 
commercially valuable such as 500 yards of various types of silk fabrics, 500 goats, 50 
barrels of wine and so on (See Table 2). These goods were far greater in value than 
those sent by Vietnam to China. In 1054, the name of Vietnam was changed from Dai 
Co Viet to Dai Viet. 
 
 
Table 2:  Tributes from Vietnam to China during North Song Dynasty. 
  
Year Tributes Source 
1046 10 elephants Songshi, (History of the Song Dynasty), Vol. 3: 




10 elephants Song Hui Yau (Collections of Important 
Documents of Song Dynasty), Vol. 4: Fanyi Si. 
(Foreign Countries). [《宋会要》。蕃夷四。] 
1058 
 





9 elephants Songshi (History of the Song Dynasty), Vol. 4: 







maids in the 
palace 
Zizhi Tongjian Changbian Jishi Benmo 
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Unfortunately, during Ly Nhan Tong’s (1072-1128) reign, tension brewed between 
Vietnam and China for a while. Ly Nhan Tong’s military invaded China’s border and 
seized Qinzhou, Lianzhou (now Hepu in Guangdong) and Yongzhou following his 
fervent attack on Champa.41 In 1075, Wang Anshi (王安石, 1021-1086), the prime 
minister of the Song dynasty informed the emperor of the decline of the Dai Viet’s 
government (Vietnam) after it was defeated by Champa. Since Dai Viet had only the 
strength of 10 thousand soldiers, it was a golden opportunity for China to oust the Ly 
dynasty from the common China-Vietnam border where chaos broke out from time to 
time according to Wang Anshi.42 
   Consequently, the Song emperor instructed Guo Kui to capture Vietnam 
because Ly Nhan Tong had ignored all the warnings given. Besides mobilizing his 
troops, the Chinese emperor passed a decree to forbid all the provinces to trade with 
Dai Viet. Upon hearing the news, the Ly ruler sent Ly Thuong Kiet and Ton Dan with 
more than 100,000 troops to China to carry out a pre-emptive attack on the Song 
troops. In the ensuing 40-day battle near Yongzhou (modern-day Nanning), the Dai 
Viet troops were victorious, capturing the generals of three Song dynasty’s armies.43 In 
1076, the Song emperor formed an alliance with the Champa king before invading Dai 
Viet. Ly Nhan Tong again sent Ly Thuong Kiet (1019-1105), who proved that he was 
one of the many great military strategists of Vietnam. He placed spikes under the Nhu 
Nguyet River before tricking the Song dynasty troops into the deadly trap, killing more 
than 1,000 Song soldiers and forcing the defeated army to retreat from Dai Viet. The 
conflict was finally settled when Ly Nhan Tong sent emissaries to seek reconciliation 
with the Song dynasty. After the death of Ly Than Ton (1128-1138), in the era of Ly 
Anh Ton (1138-1175), the Song ruler changed the name of Vietnam from Jiaozhi (Giao 
Chi) to Annan (Annam). In 1164, Emperor Song Xiaozong (1163–1189) declared Ly 
Anh Ton as King of Annam.44  
  These developments showed that China believed in integrity (wangdao王道, 
Kingly Way of Governance or Kingly Way) as the core of a diplomatic relationship.45 
Embracing Confucius’ belief of peace, China also welcomed (Vietnamese) emissaries. 
Niu Junkai argues that Vietnam had created a bond with the Song dynasty that relied 
on the abundance of China’s culture and civilization.46   
 
 
Social and Cultural Impact of Song Era on Vietnamese Ly Dynasty  
 
The influence of Chinese culture can be seen when the Ly dynasty adapted 
Confucianism in its administrative structure such as in the centralization of power and 
the introduction of a tax and a legal system modelled on China’s. For the first time in 
Vietnamese history, Ly Can Duc (1072-1128) introduced an examination system for 
civil servants based on China’s syllabus, covering Chinese history, literature and 
classical studies in 1075.47 According to Truong Buu Lam, such a measure was taken 
to select court officials and administrators who could strengthen the administration of 
the Ly dynasty in its efforts to build a new Vietnam.48 Then, came the Mandarin 
classes that created court officials and moral leaders among the Vietnamese civilians. 
Throughout the Ly dynasty, as many as 27 jinshi (metropolitan graduates) were 
appointed from four public exams which had been carried out.49 According to Yu Yan, 
these mandarins of the higher hierarchy would influence the formulation of 
government policies as opposed to the role of the middle class of mandarins who were 
to contribute mainly towards the implementation or realization of the policies.50 In this 
way, Confucianism had permeated every aspect of the people’s lives and the 
government’s administration.51 
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  The relationship between China and Vietnam was greatly geared towards 
strengthening the status of Mahayana Buddhism as the official religion and the 
teachings of Buddha reached its golden age in the era of the Ly dynasty.52 The religious 
figures acted as the Quoc Su (main advisors) who arranged the Ly kings’ 
administrative affairs.53 For example, Ly Phat Ma (1005-1054) brought in classic texts 
of Mahayana Buddhism from China and tried to influence the Vietnamese to accept 
Buddhism while many monks from China like Cao Tang who founded Thao Duong 
(Cao Tang Temple) had received support from him. 150 temples were built in the area 
of Thang Long. Among them were the Xintian Yusi (Temple of the Flourish Heaven) 
and Wufeng Xingluo (Temple of Five Phoenixes Stars).54  
  Meanwhile, Ly Thanh Tong (1054-1072), influenced by Taoist belief and 
Confucianism, built Van Mieu (the Temple of Literature) which according to him, was 
to sharpen the people’s minds. He also built idols of Zhou Gong (Duke of Zhou), 
Confucius and 72 sages for the people to worship.55 Le Thanh Khoi and Nguyen Van 
Que believe that during the governance of the Ly dynasty (1009-1028), Vietnam was 
immersed deeply in Chinese culture even more so than before.56 Their view is also 
supported by Alexander Woodside who claims that in the 11th century, the traces of 
Chinese culture were present in every aspect of life in Vietnam.57 
  However, the internal political struggle that was rife resulted in popular 
rebellion against the Ly dynasty. This situation was exploited by Tran Thu Do, a senior 
minister of the Ly government who insisted that the queen Ly Chieu Hoang, who was 
in power, should surrender the throne to Tran Thai Tong (1225-1258). Finally, in 1225, 






Vietnam forged its own social civilisation and local order once it had separated from 
China. However, the influence and pressure from China was still felt in Vietnam 
because its history was closely linked  to that of China. In foreign relations with the 
Song dynasty, Vietnam during the Dinh, Le and Ly dynasties was just a vassal state, 
although at its zenith, it had sent troops into Chinese territory to fight the Song dynasty 
overlord. The Sino-Vietnamese tributary system played a significant role in their 
traditional relations, both politically and diplomatically. This tributary relationship of 
Vietnam as an independent state with China began during the Song dynasty. It became 
a formal Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic connection. Vietnam’s frequent tribute activities 
and the Song’s bestowal of titles were accompanied by occasional wars. Tribute, 
intertwined with wars, continued for several hundred years from the Song era during 
which, successive dynastic changes occurred in Vietnam. 
However, this tributary connection was sustained because the rulers of Vietnam 
adhered to China’s World Order by seeking Chinese approval and title bestowal to lay 
a strong foundation for their reign as soon as they ascended to the throne. They needed 
the political support of China to enhance their position within the country to thoroughly 
convince the local population of their validity as rulers. That is why Vietnam’s rulers 
of the Dinh, Le and Ly dynasties had not failed to beseech title conferment from China 
soon after their  authority was established. Tributes to China were fervently dispatched 
to the Song dynasty in acknowledgement of  its suzerainty. China also stood to  benefit 
from this tributary arrangement because it reinforced its suzerain position and 
illustrious status as the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. Acting within the tributary framework, 
Song China, as the overlord of Vietnam, appeared to have let the Dinh, Le and Ly 
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dynasties off rather lightly for being involved in the domestic political tussle for power. 
The Song emperor had good reasons for doing so. He actually needed time to unite his 
people from within and strengthen his military power from without in the face of threat 
from its formidable opponent, in the north, which is Champa. Hampered by these 
constraints, the Song dynasty was forced to let Vietnam alone for the time being. He 
also needed breathing space to recoup his strength to deal with the setback. In the 
meantime, the Dinh. Le and Ly dynasties, in order to safeguard itself, had continued its 
agenda of sending tributes to China to maintain their tributary  relationship, giving the  
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